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MINORITIES IN THE MARKET PLACE
HAROLD DEMSETZ*

The purposes of this essay are to argue that most legal constraints on the operation of the market penalize those in our society
who are discriminated against, and that such groups can generally
expect to fare worse in the polling place than in the free market
place. This essay may serve a useful purpose in view of the support
given by discriminated-against minorities to the transference of
decisions from the market to the polling place. In part I we define
terms and make clear our assumptions. In part II we consider the
argument and offer some evidence. Some implications for political
organization are presented in part III.
I
The words discriminationagainst or non-preference for persons
will be used to express an aversion to association with these persons.
A taste for discrimination we identify as a taste for segregation.
The "goodness" or "badness" of particular tastes for association
will not be a subject of our discourse, the purpose of which is to
assess effects and not to make ethical judgments. However, lest the
words to follow be interpreted as a general condemnation of discrimination, we shall pause for a paragraph to assert the useful
role that can be played by discrimination and to reveal our broad
use of the word.
Because they are discriminated against, women who are plain and
overweight use the techniques of cosmetics, styling, diets, and
exercise to beautify themselves, and uneducated persons desirous of
associating with the educated find it advantageous to acquire more
education. Only if we are not ready to admit that beauty and education are characteristics to which encouragement should be given
can we claim that discrimination serves no useful purposes. Indeed, although mistakes are often made as to what are the "appropriate" or "useful" criteria upon which to discriminate, there
can be no doubt that discrimination is one of the strongest forces
* Associate Professor of Business Economics, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
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for change in a free society. Discrimination against the uneducated, the criminal, and the vulgar provides powerful incentives for
persons to choose courses of action judged to be more desirable by
those who are discriminating." In cases where the characteristic
being discriminated against allows for no choice alternative to a
non-preferred person, as where color is discriminated against per se,
discrimination cannot serve as an incentive for developing traits
preferred by the discriminator. In such cases, the value of discrimination (but not of the right to discriminate) rests solely on
the effect it has on the well-being of the discriminator and on that
of the non-preferred. It cannot rest on the well-being that comes
about through a change (in the color) in the non-preferred.
In assessing the effects of the market place and of the polling
place, we shall always adopt the viewpoint of the non-preferred.
Our evaluations will not necessarily be the same as those derivable
from the opposite viewpoint, nor will they necessarily be different.
Many of our conclusions about political processes will depend on
the non-preferred being a political minority.
No men that we are considering in this essay live only for association with preferred persons. Our first assumption is that people
are motivated by many desires. They prefer more of wealth, power,
respect, leisure, goodwill, freedom, and association with preferred
people. This list of desires is not complete nor is it necessarily in
order of importance. Our discussion will emphasize the desire for
wealth and for association with preferred people.
The second assumption is that preferences are substitutable.
Greater wealth can compensate one for less association with persons
he prefers, and, likewise, greater association with preferred persons
can compensate one for accepting less wealth. Persons described in
our essay can be induced to accept more association with non-preferred persons if, in return, they are offered more wealth.2
In evaluating the workings of the market and polling places we
shall, as we have said, judge according to the well-being of nonpreferred persons. Which of two alternative situations enhances
1

This is true irrespective of the degree to which our present choices are

determined by our past. If certain acts of discrimination are part of our past,
we will behave differently than otherwise.
2 Many

readers will recognize this as a form of the basic law of demand

used in economics. The higher the cost of a preferred action, the less frequently will that action be taken.
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the well-being of a person is to be judged solely by which one he
would choose. He may prefer a lower-paying job with non-pecuniary
advantages to a higher-paying one without the same non-pecuniary
advantages. In such cases, we judge the lower-paying job to be the
one that enhances his well-being. This brings us to our third assumption. We assume that persons know what is best for themselves.
This does not mean that we assume perfect knowledge, but rather
we assume that when making a decision as to whether or not to seek
out someone more expert, persons act in their self-interest. It would
be well for the reader to pause and reflect on these assumptions, for
much of what follows derives logically from them.
We shall be interested in how behavior can be modified so as to
improve the lot of non-preferred persons. The following three ways
of altering behavior will set the limits of our discourse.
(1)

The
(a)
(b)
(2) The

individual compensation methods.
Individual wealth compensation.
Individual personal characteristic compensation. 8
method of majoritarian democracy.

Our list excludes many methods of influencing behavior-violence, power, appeal to the hereafter-and concentrates our attention
on the methods which will be of practical concern to us. The
methods of individual compensation involve the use of rewards or
penalties by individuals to influence the behavior of other individuals. The incentive provided by the offering or withdrawal of wealth
compensation needs no elaboration. Personal characteristic compensation refers to the use by an individual of beauty, personality,
race, religion, etc., to compensate another person for making a
desired change in his behavior. A pleasant personality is more likely
to produce a desired change in someone's behavior than is an unpleasant one, and the appeal of one's neighbor or relative is likely
to be more effective than a stranger's. Either form of individual
compensation is permissive of a wide variety of responses from
individuals according to how each weights the offered reward.
The method of majoritarian democracy refers to the passage of
laws by voting majorities, the intention of which is uniformly to
'For good treatments of personal characteristic compensation, see BECKER,
DISCRIMINATION (1957); Alchian & Kessel, Competition, Monopoly, and the Pursuit of Pecuniary Gain, in ASPECTS OF LABOR
ECONOMICS 157 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1962).
THE ECONOMICS OF
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prohibit or require a specified behavior. Such laws are assumed not
to allow (legally) a variety of responses, nor can they be enacted
by an individual. Both these descriptions are simplifications, but
they catch the essence of the differences between the two methods.
The simplification involved can best be brought out by way of
example:
Suppose some of us desire that wheat be produced in larger
quantities. A method of majoritarian democracy would be for the
majority of voters to pass a law requiring all farmers to allocate
more acreage to wheat. The method of individual (wealth) compensation involves the offering of higher prices to farmers through
the effect of increases in the demands of individual consumers. The
individual compensation method allows farmers to react in varying
degrees to the incentive offered and allows some who are not aware
of the higher prices being offered not to react at all. The laws we
shall consider are of the type just described. Our stereotype for such
laws will not, of course, fit all cases. For example, the majority, in
the law they approve, may offer a subsidy for all wheat produced
and allow the farmers to react as they please. This form of law
moves closer to the compensation method but it still is not an individual affair; everyone is taxed to pay the subsidy whether or not
he personally desires more wheat at the tax price. If the law is
changed still further, by declaring that taxpayers need contribute
only the dollar amounts that they wish and that, in return, they will
receive a pro-rata share from the varying amounts of increased
acreage planted, we shall have come full circle to the method of
individual wealth compensation. If this happens, there is no purpose served by the law.
One final clarification is in order. When phrases such as "minority interests," "majority interests," etc., are used, they will mean
in the interests of most persons, but not of everyone, in the group.
"Public welfare," "social welfare," "public conscience," etc., are
phrases that will be avoided. They are ambiguous to such a degree
that they hamper exposition.4
'These phrases sometimes seem to propose as criteria for action the
welfare or conscience of a majority of persons, sometimes of a vocal minority,
and sometimes of an intellectual minority. They are never used in a way
which reasonably can be interpreted to mean the welfare or conscience of all,
or there would be no need for a clarion call to action. It is always surprising
to find that those who are inclined to use such phrases as criteria for action

19651

MINORITIES IN THE MARKET PLACE

II
Most legal modifications of the operation of the free market
work through restrictions on prices, wages, profits, or who may
participate in the market. In this category are minimum wage laws
and price ceilings; licensing requirements for medical practice,
union membership, banks, and other vendors; and regulation of
profit rates in the electric, gas, telephone, and transportation (and
the steel) industries. The modifications introduced by these laws
seriously interfere with the use of (individual) wealth compensation for changing behavior. In the absence of appeal to further
government action, these laws force the burden of influencing behavior to fall on personal characteristic compensation. The possibility of further political action and of political action along different lines will be considered later. For the present, we confine our
attention to how the increased emphasis on personal characteristic
compensation brought about by the above types of laws works to
the disadvantage of non-preferred persons. The implications we
shall derive from this examination are independent of whether or
not the non-preferred are a minority.
It is one thing for a beautiful, young, white, Protestant woman,
as an aid to buying a better cut of steak, to display her personal
characteristics to a discriminating white, Protestant butcher. It
is quite another for a plain, old, Jewish, Negro woman to try
the same tactic with the same butcher. The personal characteristics by which some persons are identified as non-preferred are
not useful for eliciting desirable behavior from those who discriminate. In this sense, contrary to the usual cliche, the market
is not color-blind. The non-preferred can compensate in part for
these characteristics by presenting other personal qualities thought
to be desirable by discriminators. But the very need to overcompensate signifies a disadvantage in this form of compensation, and
unless the non-preferred can discover some natural talent for overcompensation along other personal lines, this type of incentive
system should be avoided by them.
The types of legislative modifications of the free market we are
now considering, and certain current social attitudes, to the extent
that they are effective, all work to concentrate compensation infail to realize that most of the measures taken in Nazi Germany met these
criteria.
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creasingly on personal characteristics. A minimum wage law prevents a non-preferred person from offering his services for a lower
wage than is received by his preferred (but equally productive)
fellow worker. A lower wage request by, or a lower market-wage
for, the non-preferred job applicant offers wealth compensation to
discriminating employers that will reduce their consumption of
discrimination.5 The cost to employers of a continuance of the degree
of discrimination they have been practicing is increased by allowing
non-preferred workers to offer their services for lower wages.
Prohibiting an employer from employing workers at wages lower
than the legal minimum prohibits the offering of this wealth compensation to (or the imposition of this wealth cost on) discriminating
employers. These employers will then choose from among competing
applicants solely on the basis of personal characteristics. Non-preferred workers, turned away in larger numbers under these conditions, will be forced to accept less desirable employment elsewhere,
possibly in occupations not covered by the minimum wage law, or will
be forced into the ranks of the unemployed. Some non-preferred
workers will be hired by discriminating employers if the productivities they can offer are high enough to warrant a wage sufficiently
above the legal minimum to allow discriminating employers the
wealth compensation they require. These workers, even though they
are employed, do not directly benefit from minimum wage laws.
The problem is obvious. The law concentrates the criterion for
employability on the personal characteristics of workers, a criterion
under which the non-preferred will suffer. Legal minimum wage
laws constitute a specific prohibition on the varied offers of and
responses to wealth compensation. They fit neatly into our definition
of the method of majoritarian democracy. Such laws, however,
introduce only a legal uniform wage floor. Others introduce specific
wage uniformity at wage levels above the minimum, and these work
to the disadvantage of even the very productive non-preferred
workers.
Two important types of laws which work toward the extension
of wage uniformity are "equal pay for equal work" laws and laws
which confer a high degree of monopoly power on unions. The
method in which equal pay for equal work laws effect non-preferred
' Discrimination on the part of an employer may merely reflect the discriminatory tastes of his other workers.
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persons is identical to that of minimum wage laws. Though workers
have equal productivities, if some are preferred to others on grounds
of personal characteristics, and if the same wage must be paid to
both, the non-preferred either will not be hired or they will be hired
in lesser jobs in which they are more productive than their preferred
counterparts. Equal pay for equal work, as in the case of legal
minimums, concentrates compensation on personal characteristics
and thus works to the disadvantage of non-preferred persons. 6
There are two respects in which the power of unions works to
the disadvantage of non-preferred persons. Firstly, in cases of craft
unions, non-preferred persons may simply be kept out by various
devices. This would not be important if craft unions were not often
granted the effective monopolization of their trade by virtue of the
coercive power they can wield over their employers. Majoritarian
democracy again confronts us with a specific prohibition that works
to the disadvantage of the non-preferred-employers are prohibited
from employing non-union workers. The power for this prohibition
stems from the specific exemption of unions from anti-trust laws
and from majority tolerance of tactics such as coercive picketing.
Secondly, even in unions open to all, the insistence on equal pay
for equal work for their members again reduces the employability
of non-preferred workers by discriminating employers. Equal pay
for equal work, whether emanating directly from equal pay laws or
from the special legal treatment accorded unions, prohibits nonpreferred persons from compensating discriminating employers by
'We must be careful not to draw incorrect inferences about the profitability of discriminating. If we take the wages of preferred workers as being
independent of the degree to which discrimination is practiced by a firm, it
follows that an employer who discriminates pays for his discrimination by
foregoing the profits he could earn by hiring non-preferred workers at wages
below the value of their output. An employer can only increase his profitability by employing more non-preferred workers so long as their productivity
exceeds the wage he must pay. It follows from this that an employer who
does not discriminate according to personal characteristics will, ceteris
paribus, be the most profitable competitor in the market place. The offering
of wealth compensation by non-preferred workers in the form of offering
their services at lower wage rates will increase the relative profitability of
those discriminating employers who, in response to this compensation, reduce
the degree of discrimination they practice. Those who respond less to the
offer of wealth compensation will operate their firms less profitably, whereas
those who require little or no wealth compensation, i.e., those who do not
discriminate, will run the most profitable firms. Of course, those who earn

smaller nominal returns because they discriminate will earn nonmonetary
returns in their increased consumption of preferable association.
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offering wealth compensation. Since no wage differential can be
offered, since no cost can be imposed on employers who discriminate,
fewer persons who are non-preferred will be hired for the jobs they
seek. Forced to seek less desirable employment, non-preferred persons will suffer a reduction in their well-being. It should be emphasized that these non-preferred can be plain women or physically
deformed persons as well as Jews or Negroes.7
The specific examples we have been discussing show the general
-principles at work. The existence of non-preference in combination
with legal (or moral) prohibitions on the use of wealth incentives
by non-preferred persons forces incentives to center on personal
characteristics, a form of incentives which reduces the well-being of
persons being discriminated against. Any existing degree of nonpreference will reduce the well-being of non-preferred persons to a
greater extent the more effective are the constraints placed on the use
of wealth compensation. Legal measures taken by the government,
which has a monopoly on law-giving and on police power, comprise
some of the more effective constraints on the use of wealth. What
is not so obvious is how indirectly such laws can work. Consider
a union which enjoys an effective monopoly on employment in a
certain trade or industry, the monopoly power stemming from the
legal treatment we accord unions. Suppose further that neither employers nor employees are discriminators, but that union agents
are. Let the union secure an attractive wage increase which enlarges
the demand for union membership. Now, neither the government, employers, nor rank and file workers desire to discriminate, but all three
groups frown on the sale of union membership by union agents to
the highest bidders. The agents would be voted out of office if they
resorted to the market in allocating memberships. This moral constraint, backed by the union's monopoly power, effectively prohibits
non-preferred persons from using wealth incentives to overcome
the discrimination of union agents. Union memberships will go
primarily to preferred persons.' If applicants could avoid being
channeled through the union hiring monopoly, if they could avoid
the need for union membership and thus avoid the moral constraint
"What about Jews hiring Jews and Negroes hiring Negroes, etc.? Although the direction of non-preference may change, our analysis remains
applicable.
' For a more detailed treatment of this example, see Alchian & Kessel,
supra note 3.
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on the sale of union membership, they would be hired by non-discriminating employers.
The relevance of monopoly, or the effectiveness of the constraint
on the use of wealth, can be highlighted a little more. Suppose the
government suppresses wage demands for reasons of national policy,
and that union members, in fact, are discriminators. Prevented from
exacting pecuniary monopoly profits in the form of wage increases,
the union can instead use its power to secure more control over hiring
procedures. In this way it can exact non-pecuniary gains in the form
of more successful exclusion of non-preferred job applicants.
The essence of the problem is the coupling of non-preference with
the ability to prevent the use of wealth incentives, an ability which,
to be effective, must be backed by some significant market power.
The most effective market power is that which can be enforced by
the police power of the government.
The subject of our essay is discrimination, which we have defined
only as an aversion to association. But it is worth mentioning that
the kinds of laws and market power we have been discussing above
also are disadvantageous to those workers who are relatively unproductive. These persons, if they are prevented from offering their
services for wages lower than are received by more productive
workers, will have difficulty securing employment. The existence of
a strong positive correlation between persons who are discriminated
against for reasons of personal characteristics and persons who are
relatively unproductive will double the effect of wage and labor laws
in reducing their well-being. Such persons will have difficulty securing
employment from discriminating and non-discriminating employers.
Non-discriminating employers will need to receive wealth compensation in the form of lower wage payments to offset low productivities.
Discriminating employers require an additional wealth incentive to
overcome their aversion to association.
Next, let us consider the attempt in this country to regulate the
profit rates of several industries. To the extent that such regulation
is effective, it reduces the well-being of non-preferred workers.
The direct attempts to establish the rate of profit of railroads and
public utilities at some normal level reduces the effectiveness of
offers of wealth compensation in overcoming discriminatory behavior. Suppose the most profitable course available to firms in
these industries is to employ non-preferred persons at lower wages
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than need be offered to preferred persons. If this hiring policy
is expected to result in profit rates in excess of the allowed normal rate
of return, firms will expect the regulatory process to prevent the
capture of these returns. The offered wealth compensation for not
discriminating is not realizable. In such cases, those who control
the hiring policy will cater to their preferences for association to a
greater degree than they would in the absence of a profit constraint.
They would be more inclined toward desirable personalities, desirable
religions, etc., and less inclined toward persons who are most productive per dollar of wage expenditure.
However, there is a second way, which has no counterpart in
wage laws, in which profit regulation works to the disadvantage of
non-preferred persons. Not only are rewards reduced for hiring less
costly, non-preferred labor because regulatory commissions attempt
to keep profit rates to a normal level, but, in addition, penalties for
hiring more costly preferred labor are reduced. Price increases may
allow a normal profit rate to be obtained at higher cost levels.
Regulatory commissions, by virtue of their monopoly over prices,
can allow prices to be raised to cover higher costs. One method of
increasing cost levels is to cater to preferences even though pampering these preferences is costly. Employing workers who are preferred for reasons of association, but not productivity, will raise
costs and may depress profit rates to below normal levels, but subsequently allowed price increases may go a long way toward offsetting
the higher costs.
The effects of profit regulation of this type extend to the buying
of supplies and materials as well as to the hiring of labor. Why
trade with sellers who charge lower prices if you are not allowed
to increase your profit rate and if you are protected from competition
in the setting of higher prices which yield the normal rate? Instead,
be willing to pay higher prices if you can deal with sellers with whom
you prefer to associate. These effects, of course, depend on the
general inability of regulatory commissions to specify appropriate
cost levels. The whole production procedure is so complex and
varies so much among firms, that it is virtually impossible for a
commission to be able to specify such cost levels. 10
±0

See
Theibid.
issue here is not whether presidents of utilities desire to dis-

criminate or whether only particular utilities will so desire. The issue is the
reduced emphasis on cost brought about by the regulatory process. Public
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For our next case let us consider licensing. The attainment of
professional and business positions by non-preferred persons, which
would confer some hiring power to them, is itself often limited by
requiring licenses or accreditation for practicing many professions
and operating many businesses. Where law or morality effectively
prohibits the sale for profit of these licenses, we can expect greater
attention to be paid to personal characteristics compensation. The
establishment of requirements and even the issue of licenses is often
controlled by persons who are already members of the business or the
profession. Craft unions and medical practice are examples. Such
persons are generally prohibited from selling membership for profit.
They will thus be more inclined to exercise their tastes for association. If a government official controls the licensing, he can be expected to give more attention to the personal characteristics he
prefers and to the impact on votes particular applicants are expected
to have. This is not the place to discuss other reasons for or against
licensing procedures. Our claim is the more modest one of pointing
to the greater emphasis that will be given to personal characteristics
compensation in the selection of applicants if membership cannot be
sold for profit. 1
As a final exercise in this part of our argument, let us consider
the effects of legal price ceilings. Some discriminating sellers can
be persuaded to allow some integration of their customers if nonpreferred persons are allowed to bid for some of the services of such
sellers by offering wealth compensation. A law which establishes
an effective ceiling on the prices at which sellers can offer their wares
prohibits the use of (direct) wealth inducements. It declares illegal
the very force which can be used to divert emphasis away from
personal characteristics and to direct some of the wares of disutilities will treat costs more loosely and will not institute as careful policing
action on internal operations. This looseness allows costs to be increased
throughout the firm. The decreased emphasis on costs can result in the behavior described above by those doing the hiring and purchasing. One
utility's cost may be raised because of discriminatory hiring, another's
because of ineffective purchasing procedures.
" The case against trade unions on this score is fairly well documented,
and we give no specific references. The case against the American Medical
Association can be found in Kessel, Price Discriminationin Medicine, 1 J.L.
& EcoN. 20 (1958). Further, we should note that many general licensing
procedures for businesses, liquor stores for example, restrict owners to persons
who have established credit and good reputation in the community. Such
requirements are likely to work to the disadvantage of persons not preferred
by the community.
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criminating sellers to non-preferred persons. When price ceilings
are made effective by the power of the government and when discriminating sellers are involved, we prevent the free market from
improving the well-being of those actually discriminated against.
It is important to note that we do not claim that all members of a
group are made worse off by such laws. We claim that those actually
discriminated against are hurt. It may be that other members of
the group who are not discriminated against and who have less
purchasing power than other persons are aided.
Up to this point, we have argued that most of the legal infringements on the operation of free markets can be expected to worsen
the well-being of those being discriminated against. All conceivable
anti-free market laws need not produce these effects. It is a fact,
however, that until very recently all major anti-free market laws
that have proved to be politically palatable have been of this type.
The major exceptions have been some parts of Fair Employment
Practice' laws. These attempt to directly reduce the degree of
discrimination practiced in hiring practices. Whether we can expect
this type of law to have a measurable impact on discrimination is a
subject to which we will return shortly. We shall then discuss other
possible anti-free market laws which could be expected, in and of
themselves, to have effects more to the liking of non-preferred persons. 3 Before we consider these laws, it is necessary to embellish one
aspect of the preceding arguments.
We have emphasized that our argument applies only to those who
are actually discriminated against. The number of persons in a
"non-preferred group" who are actually discriminated against is
limited to those who are inclined to transact with trading partners
who have discriminatory attitudes and is further limited by the
existence of any sizable costs for sorting out preferred from nonpreferred persons. Although a seller of products (or a hirer of labor)
may prefer non-association with certain groups of persons, if the
costs of sorting non-preferred from preferred persons are too great
in the type of market activity being carried on, he may choose not
to indulge his taste for discrimination. Up to this point we have
1
1

E.g., N. Y.

LABOR LAw § 220-e.
The phrase "in and of themselves" indicates that the long-run effects
of these laws on such things as personal liberty is ignored. Also, we include
anti-trust laws as pro-free market even though they may curtail personal
liberty.
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ignored these sorting costs, concentrating our attention instead on
the cost which is imposed by the offer of wealth compensation by
non-preferred persons. In some cases sorting costs may be high
relative to the benefits (to the discriminator) of discriminating.
The higher are the costs of sorting people, the fewer will be
the number of discriminators who actually cater to their taste for
association. Sorting costs are generally lower, for example, in the
case of Negroes than they are for Jews. A picture on the job application or on the university admission application reveals the Negro
but not the Jew. Should persons have an equal taste for discrimination against both groups, the higher cost of recognizing Jews will
reduce the incidence of discrimination against them relative to that
against Negroes.'

4

Sorting costs are prohibitively high when sales are made from
vending machines, whereas in personal service stores clerks can
merely ignore recognizable non-preferred persons. And the nonpreferred person is likely to fare better at the self-service meat
counter of a super-market than at a cut-to-order meat store.
For our argument, however, the essential point is that when the
costs of sorting persons are high, it is necessary for us to hedge on
some of the conclusions we have reached. Many of our conclusions
still follow necessarily, but others follow only with a high degree of
probability. As a strong example countering the logical necessity
of one of our earlier conclusions, consider again the discriminating
union agent who is restrained from selling union memberships to
the highest bidders. If there is no cost to sorting persons, he will
necessarily confer these memberships on only members of preferred
groups; allowing him to sell these memberships will necessarily tend
to reduce the degree of discrimination he practices. Alternatively,
if the personal costs to him of interviewing and rejecting applicants
is high relative to the personal advantage of preferred association,
he may let some non-preferred persons acquire membership even
though he cannot sell the memberships. Given the reduction in discrimination occasioned by these sorting costs, suppose he is now allowed to sell memberships. He may find preferred applicants willing
and able to bid high enough to overcome some of the resistance to
" A classic attempt to reduce the costs of sorting Jews from non-Jews
was the Nazi requirement that Jews wear yellow arm bands. This attempt
was frustrated for a short time in occupied Denmark by non-Jewish Danes
who voluntarily placed yellow bands around their arms.
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discrimination caused by the sorting costs. Consequently, sale of
memberships may induce him to reduce the number of non-preferred
persons in his union. For this event to occur, we require a very
unlikely confluence of two circumstances: Firstly, sorting costs must
be high and they must be borne by the discriminator. Secondly, preferred persons, in sufficient numbers, must be willing to outbid nonpreferred persons.
Preferred persons may be willing to outbid non-preferred persons
for monopoly wages, but would they be willing to pay more for
commodities and services ordinarily purchased in the market? Probably not. Whites might generally be able to outbid Negroes for, say,
union memberships, but would the cost of sorting out Negroes be
high? Probably not. And, while the costs of sorting out Jews might
be high, can we expect non-Jews to be able generally to out-bid
Jews? I am told probably not. It cannot be denied that a simultaneous satisfaction of the three requirements might be found, but
the frequency with which it is likely to be found seems sufficiently
low for us to establish the credibility of the main conclusions of our
earlier argument.
Let us now turn to anti-free market laws which are designed to
beneficially affect non-preferred persons. These kinds of laws are
not generally found in our legal framework and we shall require
some imagination to conjure them onto these pages. This will not
be as difficult as it might appear, but before exercising our imagination let us consider the one major case of existing statutory law
designed specifically to aid non-preferred persons. Fair Employment Practices laws state that it is illegal to discriminate on the basis
of color, religion, or nationality in the hiring of workers and in the
terms on which they are hired. To the extent that such laws are
effective they can reduce the impact of discriminatory attitudes, in
terms either of the degree to which segregation is practiced or of the
degree to which non-preferred persons must offer wealth compensation to secure employment.
There are laws and then there are laws. All of them are not
equally easy to enforce. The very nature of Fair Employment laws
would lead us to believe that they are among the most difficult to
make effective. For they do not require every firm to count among
its employees ten per cent Negroes, thirty per cent Catholics, and
one per cent Jews, standards that would be relatively easy to enforce.
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Instead they require that firms must be reasonable and just in their
hiring practices. Now, the greater the degree to which subjective
evaluation, to which reasonableness and justice, enter into the criteria for legal behavior, the more difficult and expensive it becomes
to enforce a law successfully. Reasonable men can disagree on the relative competence of workers and unreasonable men can find myriad
ways in which to appear to be reasonable. This has two implications. First, to establish reasonableness, we will require acceptable
enforcement of the law to undertake a case by case treatment which
will be very slow and very expensive; not many cases will be treated
and most who would be judged violators will escape examination.
Secondly, since the criterion to be applied by the law is largely subjective, it will not be an acceptable enforcement practice to penalize violators severely. When persons can try to behave reasonably but cannot know the legal criterion for reasonable behavior, it is unlikely that the law will threaten them with weighty
penalties. Those who desire to violate the law repeatedly will not be
overly deterred from their practices. In most cases, these laws require a violator merely to rectify his behavior in a particular case.
Minimum wage laws and union equal pay demands are easier to
enforce. It is one thing to say that below minimum legal wages are
being paid and that two union members in the same job classification
are receiving different wages. It is quite another to say what is a just
wage or a just job classification. The specificity of minimum wage
laws and union wage rates eases the enforcement problem. This is not
to say that such laws do not face considerable enforcement difficulty,
but only that they face less difficulty than those involving more subjective evaluation of behavior. Likewise, it is not so difficult for
regulatory commissions to control profit rates, given the cost base on
which the control is based, as it is for the commissions to determine
the appropriate or just cost base."
The difficulty that can be encountered in enforcing even the more
objective laws is highlighted by the following quotations on the
effects of the one-dollar minimum wage law made effective on
March 1, 1956:
Minimum wage violations were found in 21% of investigations
made for enforcement purposes between July and December,
1 See Stigler & Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of
Electricity, 5 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1962).
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Discovered underpayments of the minimum wage
1956 ....
more than tripled between fiscal year 1956 and fiscal year
If for every discovered violation of the minimum, three
1957 ....
went undiscovered [this being the ratio of discovered to undiscovered underpayment estimated by the Department of Labor for
fiscal year 1958], then about 310,000 covered employees were paid
less than the minimum in fiscal year 1957 .... The Department
estimated that total underpayments both discovered and undiscovered totalled $80 million.10
Nonetheless, the minimum wage law is sufficiently enforceable
to leave traces of evidence. The effects of minimum wage laws can
be revealed by examining the repercussions of changes in the level
of legal minimum wage rates on the employment of household
workers. Such an examination was recently published by Yale
Brozen, T and we repeat here some of its findings.
The minimum wage clause of the Fair Labor Standards Act applies to most occupations.... Private household work is one of
the few completely excluded occupations. Since it is an alternative
opportunity for many workers affected by minimum wage rate
provisions ... the changes in this line of work can provide some
clues as to the effect of the lifting of the wage floor in covered
occupations. Trifling movements in employment opportunities in
many other categories are concentrated on domestic service and
should produce detectable effects....
In each instance [since 1949] when the minimum wage rate rose,
the number of persons employed as household workers rose. The
rise was not the result of unemployed household workers finding
jobs since there was also a rise in the percentage of household
workers unemployed in each instance (except 1961-62, when the
decline in unemployment percentage accounts for only 15 per cent
of the rise). Evidently, some persons lost jobs in the covered
occupations (or persons who would normally have entered failed
to find jobs) and sought jobs in non-covered household work.
They found jobs and household employment rose. Also, the competition of these additional workers made it somewhat more difficult for household workers who lost their positions to find new
18
jobs.
These findings are, of course, consistent with our conclusions.
The use of the household workers category fits in well with our
16 Macesich & Stewart, Recent Department of Labor Studies of Mininnm
Wage Effects, 26 So. EcoN. J. 281, 288-89 (1960).
17 Brozen, Minimum Wage Rates and Household Workers, 5 J.L. & EcoN.
103 (1962).
18 Id. at 103-04.
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subject since most workers in this line are Negro. Even with this
evidence, however, it is difficult for our purposes to sort out the
effects of minimum wage laws on those who are discriminated against
from the effects on those who have low productivities.
Alchian and Kesse 19 present some evidence that bears directly
on the degree to which profit constraints appear to influence hiring
patterns. They offered an analysis of data published by the American Jewish Congress, which surveyed the occupations of Jewish and
non-Jewish Harvard Business School graduates. The data concerned
352 Harvard MBA graduates selected on the basis of a random
sample. Of these, 224 were non-Jewish and 128 Jewish. The 352
Harvard graduates were classified by ten industry categories.
Alchian and Kessel suggest that the proportion of Jews employed
will be less in regulated industries and in highly concentrated industries which, in fear of anti-trust, can be expected not to maximize
pecuniary profits.
The ten industries' categories are (1) agriculture, forestry and
fisheries, (2) mining, (3) construction, (4) transportation, communication, and other public utilities, (5) manufacturing, (6)
wholesale and retail trade, (7) finance, insurance, and real estate,
(8) business services, (9) amusement, recreation, and related services, and (10) professional and related services.
Categories (4) and (7) must be regarded as relatively monopolized. Therefore, if the hypothesis presented here is correct,
the relative frequency of Jews in these two fields is lower than it
is for all fields combined. The relative frequency of Jews in all
fields taken together, in the entire sample, is 36 per cent. These
data show that the frequency of Jews-74 MBAs-in the two
monopolized fields is less than 18 per cent. If a sample of 352,
of whom 36 per cent are Jews, is assigned so that 74 are in
monopolized and 278 in nonmonopolized fields, the probability
that an assignment random with respect to religion will result in
as few as 18 per cent Jews in the monopolized fields (and over
41 per cent in nonmonopolized fields) is less than 0.0005.20
Evidence of the above type that directly isolates the discrimination is difficult to find. There is much evidence, however, on the
effectiveness of minimum wage laws that is consistent with the findings of Yale Brozen. 2 '
" Alchian & Kessel, supra note 3.

2

Id. at 171.
" See Demsetz, Structural Unemployment: A Reconsideration of the
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Can evidence be produced on the impact of Fair Employment
Practice laws? Some case studies of particular firms have been
made, but evidence of general applicability is lacking. Some idea of
the effectiveness of Fair Employment Practice laws can be had by
comparing unemployment figures for those states with such laws
and those without. Our task is somewhat simplified by the twofold
classification of states given by the United States Department of
Labor and reported in the Hearings on Equal Employment Oppor-

tunity." This classification lists states according to whether, in the
judgment of the Department of Labor, they had effective Fair Employment Practice Commission laws in 1960. Fifteen states were
listed as having effective laws.2" The remainder (including Washington, D. C.) either had no laws or were thought to have ineffective
laws. In each state we can get a partial index of how well non-whites
fared in the labor market by dividing the unemployment rate among
whites by the unemployment rate among non-whites. The lower the
value of the resulting quotient, the greater the relative incidence of
unemployment among non-whites. We can then average these
quotients for each group of states and compare the average for
states with effective laws with the average for states with ineffective
or no laws. The results are presented in the following table. They
are tabulated for those states with laws deemed effective in 1960
and for other states.
STATE AVERAGES

OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AMONG WHITES
DIVIDED BY THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AMONG NON-WHITES

Year
(a) States with Effective Laws in Year 1960
Other States:
(b) Excluding the South
(c) The South*
(d) All Other States
* The 11 states of the Confederacy.
Source: Calculated from U.S. BuREAu OF THE
MERCE, CENSUS OF POPULATION, TABLE

1960
.48

1950
.48

1940
.65

.47
.59
.51

.45
.59
.49

.61
1.10
.76

CENSUS, DEP'T OF COM-

53 (1960).

Evidence and the Theory, 4 J.L. & EcoN. 80 (1961); Peterson, Employment
Effects of Minimum Wages 1938-1950, 65 J. POL. EcoN. 412 (1957).
" Hearings on S. 773, S. 1210, S. 1211, and S.1937 Before the Subcoininittee on Employment and Manpower of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, 88 Cong., 1st Sess. 109 (1962).
"Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.
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The most relevant comparison is between the effective employment law states and other states excluding the South. The South
can be expected to be atypical with respect to the index with which
we are working for the following four reasons. (1) In the interval
of years covered, the South has experienced a considerable shift to
industrialization and urbanization. (2) These states, nonetheless,
remain more agriculturally oriented than most of the other states.
(3) There has been a large emigration of Negroes from the South
to the North. These emigrants may have been the more productive
Negro residents of the South. (4) Social attitudes and institutions
in the South about the races are alleged to differ fundamentally from
those in the North and West. It is possible to speculate that the agricultural orientation of the South is fundamentally responsible for
the better showing these states give with respect to the relative
unemployment rates of the whites and non-whites in each of the
years and, further, that rapid industrialization and urbanization,
together with the emigration of more productive Negroes, account
for most of the worsening of performance between 1940 and 1950.
Non-Southern states without effective employment laws are
more closely matched to the effective-law states with regard to
industrialization and urbanization, increases in Negro population,
pace of economic change, and social attitudes and institutions toward
the races. These states are, therefore, more relevant for testing
the effectiveness of fair employment laws. Two things stand out if
we compare row (a) with row (b). Firstly, in 1960 there existed
no statistically significant difference in our index. Non-whites fared
about the same in terms of relative unemployment rates in both
groups of states. Secondly, while increasing urbanization and industrialization probably account for most of the decline in the index
from 1940 to 1960 in both groups of states, during this interval,
when most of the states with effective employment laws were acquiring the laws, the index falls by .17 in effective-law states and by
only .14 in non-effective-law states. Thus, the evidence reveals that
there is generally no significant difference in unemployment rate
ratios in 1960 for the two groups of states and that there is probably no significant difference in the performance of these two groups
of states while one group was acquiring effective laws and the other
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was not. These data are consistent with our assertions about the
ineffectiveness of these laws.2 4
Thus far in our essay we have argued that the logic of most
legal infringements on the operation of the free market implies
that they will work to the disadvantage of non-preferred persons.
In the one major case where the logic does not carry this implication
we have argued that the law would be ineffective. Some evidence
has been presented that is consistent with these arguments and more
could have been marshalled from other sources. Is it an accident that
the political processes have worked in this fashion? Or is there something about politics that makes this type of performance likely?
III
It is not impossible to devise laws that both infringe on the
operation of the free market and effectively help non-preferred persons. It turns out that these would be almost the exact opposite of
the laws we have been discussing (except for the Fair Employment
Practices law). Instead of a legal minimum wage, we would require
a carefully designed legal maximum wage. Rather than restricting
profit rates, we should offer bonuses to firms able to earn high profit
rates and impose penalties on those firms earning low profit rates.
Moral aversion to the making of profits would need to be replaced
with an attitude of respect and admiration. In short, if we changed
our Constitution so that laws passed by Congress are carried out in
reverse, and if we pass students on the basis of how well they fail
most social welfare examinations, the world could be made better
for the non-preferred at the same time that market controls were
increased.
The payment of a government bonus every time a firm increases
its profit rate will encourage the firm to accept the wealth compensations offered by non-preferred persons seeking employment. The
firm will then weigh pecuniary returns more heavily and tastes for
discrimination more lightly.
Wage ceilings designed to fall between the higher market wage
received by preferred workers and the lower wage paid to nonpreferred workers by discriminating employers will cause some pre" These findings are not conclusive, however. A more detailed study of
the degree to which whites and non-whites are found in particular industries
or job classifications in various states is needed for a more convincing demonstration.
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ferred workers to leave the labor force and others to seek less demanding employment. The wage they could earn in covered employment would no longer be high enough to attract some of them. Employers would, to some extent, find it desirable to substitute nonpreferred workers for those preferred refusing to offer their services
at the legal ceiling wage rate.
But, of course, it is unlikely that we will ever see legislation of
this type. Nor will we see Fair Employment Practices laws requiring
the enforceable standard of ten per cent Negroes in every firm's
labor force (except perhaps in the government's labor force). Most
voters will feel such legislation inimical to their well-being and will
not vote for it. Many firms are rather unsuccessful and most are
none too profitable. Why should they and their workers vote to
penalize themselves and to subsidize the success of the few profitable
firms? Why should most workers legally limit the maximum wages
they can receive? And therein lies the difficulty faced by non-preferred minorities in turning to majoritarian democracy for antifree market laws which are more to their advantage. They are a
voting minority. In a very real sense, we can substitute the phrase
"vote compensation" for "majoritarian democracy" in our list of
methods of altering behavior. Just as non-preferred persons will
find it disadvantageous to compete in the arena of personal characteristics, so minorities will find it disadvantageous to compete
in the arena of the polling place.
All political action to improve the position of minorities is not,
of course, hopeless. But success requires the support of a widely
based electorate. Such support can be had on issues which benefit
non-preferred minorities at the expense of preferred persons in only
exceptional circumstances.
Basically, there are two circumstances in which minorities can
turn to national politics with some success on such issues. One is
when the issue of concern to them is of secondary importance to
others, so that even though most people oppose the minority's
desires, they will vote primarily on the basis of other issues. The
groundwork is then set for the formation of a political coalition in
which a faction of preferred persons agrees to back legislation
favoring the non-preferred minority (even though the preferred
find such legislation distasteful) in return for the support of the
minority on more important issues which divide the majority of
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voters. For this method to have much success it is necessary that the
issue of interest to the minority be unimportant to the majority
even though they oppose the minority desire. Success is unlikely
on issues which the preferred believe would change significantly
and to their disadvantage the relative economic positions of preferred and non-preferred. It is unlikely that measures such as setting
maximum legal wages, subsidizing profits and penalizing losses,
and ten per cent of non-preferred minorities in each firm's work force
would be considered unimportant by most preferred persons.
The second case is one in which minorities find that large numbers of preferred persons actually favor the minority stand on an
issue even though some preferred seriously oppose this stand. Recent civil rights legislation25 (and Supreme Court action) is a good
example. The essential parts of this legislation, such as the public
accommodations sections2" and the section on voting rights,2" have
been a part of the Northerner's practice of life for many years and
part of his moral life for many more. And so has a single public
school system for both white and non-white. On these issues the
Northern white has sided with our Negro minority to provide the
political strength and popular support needed for legislation and
court decisions. Whatever effects these laws have will be felt in the
Southern states and not in the Northern.
It is important to note that political success requires in the case
of coalitions that the issue be unimportant. For important issues,
the minority's view must already be accepted as part of the life of a
substantial number of preferred persons. In the near future, we are
unlikely to find much non-minority national popular support on
issues such as open occupancy, forced neighborhood integration, or
forced transportation of children to distant school districts. Nor
will there be popular support for maximum legal wages, profit subsidization, etc. All these things are both important and are believed
by the majority of voters to be contrary to their long-run interests.
Recent appeals to the federal government by minorities were entirely rational because the support of Northerners could be counted
on. Further appeals for actions that affect the way of life in both
" Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. Hereinafter, the
act will be referred to only by section.
, Sections 101-07.
27 Section 201.
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North and South may be irrational, and, in any case, will be much
less successful.
Our negative conclusions about the prospects for new anti-free
market legislation which effectively helps non-preferred minorities
does not, however, extend to pro-free market legislation. Much more
support can be picked up from members of the majority for restricting somewhat the monopoly power of unions, for keeping
minimum legal wages below effective levels, for reductions in the
number of legal licensing requirements, for removal of rent ceilings
which still continue in some areas, and for changes in some of our
regulatory practices. For many in the majority still identify their
long-run interests with increased freedom of the individual. The
restoration and protection of free markets is the practical political
possibility of advantage to minorities because it is here that both
minority and majority can find some long-run advantages.
The operation of the free market has implications for the structure of political power and institutions to which minorities should
aspire. Four characteristics of the free market stand in contrast to the characteristics of the national polling place. (1) In
the free market, the imposition of costs or the bestowal of benefits
is largely an individual affair. It is unnecessary first to receive the
approval of a majority of persons before individual wealth compensation can be brought to bear on a decision maker. (2) The amount
of wealth compensation that is brought to bear can vary considerably, depending on how much of his wealth a person is willing to
commit to change behavior in the market place. A person can cut
his wage request by very much or by very little, and he can likewise
vary the price he is willing to pay. (3) In the free market, economic
power is distributed thinly among decision makers. (4) Finally,
the market through the forces of competition among many decision
makers provides a mechanism for spreading the effects of wealth
compensation to those on whom wealth incentives are not originally
brought to bear.
In contrast, the national polling place allows no direct action on
behavior unless a majority of voters support the disputed influence;
action cannot be taken individually. In addition, each voter has only
one vote to cast and cannot vary his vote compensation with the intensity of his feelings on a particular issue. Power in the current
political structure is not spread thinly but is instead increasingly con-
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centrated on two parties at the national level. Finally, a vote for a
particular candidate fails to influence the behavior of the other party
unless a very large number of votes accompanies it.
We have already dealt in some detail with the role of the first
two free market characteristics in influencing behavior so that we
need not dwell on them here. Moreover, it is unlikely that individuals will be given more than one vote to distribute or concentrate
as they please, and even more unlikely that majority requirements
will change. Examination of the political implications of these two
characteristics of free markets, therefore, would be an injudicious
use of words. We move on to consider characteristics three and four.
Several persons who cooperate in casting their dollar votes or
who independently cast them in the same way can, by virtue of the
dispersal of market power among many decision-making centers,
become very influential in changing the behavior of one such center.
The Negroes of a Southern community who withhold patronage
from discriminating bus lines or from other local vendors can force
large costs on discriminators. Likewise, if many Negroes offer their
services at low wages to a single firm, they effectively concentrate
wealth incentives on a single decision maker. This results from the
relatively small size of most enterprises in this country and from
the relatively large concentration of Negroes in certain geographic
areas. Contrast this with the ineffectiveness of withholding purchases from all bus lines in the South if all Southern communities
were populated according to the white and non-white national population averages. Or contrast the costs imposed on discriminating
firms, given that ten per cent of their job applicants offer their services
at lower wages as compared with ninety per cent of their applicants.
In the market, it is not only possible for an individual member of
the minority to offer varying quantities of dollar votes in reward for
non-discriminatory behavior, it is also possible for a minority group
to saturate a local center of economic decision making with dollar
votes. This is not possible in national politics where the maximum
saturation with political votes that is possible depends only on the
total number of minority votes compared with the total number of
majority votes. In national politics, minorities are effectively prevented from concentrating political vote compensation.
With the ability to impose costs individually in the market place
and to concentrate such costs on particular centers of economic de-
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cision making, it is possible for minorities to influence behavior substantially in particular parts of the market place. The effect of this
change in behavior will be extended by the market to other centers
of decision making. A firm hiring many non-preferred will be able
to offer its product at lower prices than more discriminatory competitors. This will raise the cost of discriminating to these competitors, for in order to maintain their market, they will now be
forced to lower price. If competitors lower price without increasing
the number of non-preferred hired, they will need to suffer a personal wealth loss. This brings home the cost of discriminating to
them and reduces the amount of discrimination they will practice.
The spread of wealth compensation from its original point of application to other parts of the market can continue as long as nonpreferred are willing and able to supply services to competitors.
It might be supposed that these competitive forces will work only
if the ultimate buyers of products do not know or care what labor
was used to produce products. Ultimate consumers often are indifferent, and in this respect, the market is color-blind. But consumers
sometimes do care who produces a product or who consumes it with
them. Even so, the market will still work to spread the effects of
wealth compensation. A law requiring every can of produce to
be marked to indicate whether it was produced with non-preferred
or with preferred workers would allow consumers to discriminate
in their purchases. Nonetheless, if the price of a can produced by
non-preferred workers is lower, a wealth cost will be imposed on
ultimate buyers who discriminate. Some or all such buyers will buy
less of the product produced by preferred workers because of its
higher relative cost. In similar fashion, the ability of non-preferred
persons to bid appealing prices for homes, and thereby to acquire
some homes, will force those who wish to discriminate to pay
moving costs and otherwise to reduce their well-being. Prices for
nearby homes will be forced down if their owners insist on selling
only to preferred persons. Thus, the market will spread the costs of
discriminating in these cases also. (It must be remembered that we
are talking about a free market and not one in which preferred persons are allowed to collude to restrict the terms of sale of property.)
It is possible to modify the structure of political power so that
majoritarian democracy will more closely resemble the operation of
free markets. Democracy as we know it requires one vote per person
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and majority approval, so that it is not possible to imitate the first
two important characteristics of the free market. Individuals do not
have additional votes to concentrate nor can they influence any
political decision individually. However, a redistribution of political
authority from the national and state levels to the level of local
communities will allow non-preferred persons to control the majority
of votes in those local communities where they reside in relatively
large numbers.
States are too large to enable non-preferred groups easily to
dominate political decisions. But, except for those cases where
minority preferences have already been accepted by substantial numbers of preferred persons, cases which have already been largely
exploited, a change in the distribution of political power upward to
the central government is a move in the wrong direction for nonpreferred minorities. At the national level their votes are necessarily
outnumbered. The correct direction in which to shift power is to
the community level. The resulting dispersal of political power
parallels the dispersal of economic power in the market. And, in the
same way that several members of the minority can concentrate
their dollar votes on an economic decision center, they can effectively
concentrate their political votes on a local center of political decision
making.
Control over political decisions at some local center will allow
the (national) minority to adopt a political program that is ideal
from its viewpoint. This does not mean a program which mercilessly
penalizes the (nationally) preferred persons who reside in their
community. If the local political platform is over-zealous, preferred
persons will leave the community, and, in the short run, (nationally)
non-preferred persons may move in from other communities. (This
shifting in residence is a competition among localities akin to the
spread of wealth compensation in the market place.) The resulting
segregation may be undesirable culturally and economically and
not at all in the interest of the (national) minority. Instead, a more
moderate program, possibly concentrating on equality of opportunity,
might be optimal. Such a program could improve the position of nonpreferred persons without producing undesirable amounts of segregation.
While minorities gain this advantage in some local communities, preferred persons will exercise the same powers in other com-
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munities. But preferred majorities will have this power over all
communities if control is concentrated at the national level. To
prevent the majority from using this power extravagantly in all
communities, it is necessary to transfer power from the central government and states to local communities. And to prevent local communities which are controlled by preferred persons from adopting
over-zealous programs of their own, it is necessary to abandon
majoritarian democracy for some form of constitutional democracy.
The long-run political interests of non-preferred minorities thus lie
in the opposite direction from that which they usually pursue. The
non-preferred minorities should now side with those who favor a
freer market, stronger adherence to the Constitution, and greater
dispersal of political power to local governments.

